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This paper investigates whether economic dependence on China 
affected African countries’ vote choices on one of China’s most serious 
foreign policy concerns: UN country-specific human rights (hereafter UNHR) 
resolutions. The previous research showed that African countries trading 
more with China are more likely align with China in opposing UNHR 
resolutions. On the contrary, I find that African countries’ support for 
UNHR resolutions has increased since 2002, despite the fact that bilateral 
trade with China and Chinese aid have continuously increased. 
To explain this empirical puzzle, I argue that the diffusion of human 
rights norm could explain diminishing influence of China’s charm offensive 
on African countries’ UN human rights voting. Growing emphasis on a 
interventionist approach towards human rights agenda in the early 2000s has 
led to the increase in normative pressures to support UNHR resolutions.  
This paper conducts both case studies and statistical analyses to 
support the argument. Case study on South Africa is conducted to illustrate 
how norm diffusion significantly influence UN voting pattern of countries 
who have forged close political and economic ties with China. During the 
period 2000-2014, South Africa’s stance has changed from opposing UNHR 
resolutions to being neutral. This change was attributable to normative 
criticisms on South Africa’s voting records. South Africa was more 
constrained by the criticisms as they revealed the inconsistency between 
South Africa’s voting pattern and its previous commitment to emerging 
human rights norm such as participating in the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and Human Rights Council (HRC). 
For statistical analyses, this dissertation utilizes the variation in the 
membership of the ICC and HRC among African countries as an empirical 
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leverage. Two mechanisms could explain the effect of ICC and HRC 
membership on UNHR　 voting. First, members of these two organizations 
previously signalled their commitment to emerging human rights norms and 
hence would face the cost of losing its legitimacy within the international 
community when not supporting UNHR resolutions. Second, regardless of 
perceiving the cost of their commitment, these countries are more likely to 
support UNHR based on their affinity towards emerging human rights norm. 
Considering the aforementioned mechanisms of norm diffusion, this 
paper suggests two hypotheses. First, ICC and HRC members would more 
readily vote in favour of UNHR resolutions during the period 2002-2012. 
Second, during the period 1992-2002, the effect of ICC and HRC 
membership would not be effective whereas Chinese trade would. This paper 
uses time series cross sectional data covering 46 African countries for the 
period 1992-2012 and find empirical evidence to support two hypotheses.
My dissertation aims to overcome two limitations of the existing 
research on political influence of China’s charm offensive For one, my 
dissertation demonstrates that normative and institutional factors can also 
influence China’s charm offensive strategy, whereas the previous literature 
focused solely on the effect of economic and military factors. African 
countries’ voting behavior in terms of UNHR resolutions shows that 
normative concern often overrides material payoffs in international politics. 
Second, this paper sheds light on dynamic relationship between China and 
African countries which has received relatively little attention compared to 
Sino-Asian relations. 
Keyword: Sino-African relations, China’s charm offensive, UN human rights 
voting, economic interdependence, norm diffusion 




1. China’s Charm Offensive and Human Rights in Africa ...........................1 
2. Research Question .........................................................................................5
3. Argument and Method ..................................................................................7
Ⅱ. Economic Dependence and Political Influence: Literature Review .........10
Ⅲ. Norm Diffusion and Limits of China’s Charm Offensive ........................19
1. International Human Rights Norm Diffusion ...........................................19
2. Norm Diffusion in Africa: Case Study of South Africa ........................30
3. Theoretical Hypotheses ................................................................................40
Ⅵ. Empirical Analyses .......................................................................................49  
1. Model, Data, and Method ..........................................................................49
2. Results ...........................................................................................................54
Ⅴ. Conclusion ......................................................................................................58 
Bibliography ..........................................................................................................60
Appendix ...............................................................................................................70
<Appendix 1>  UNHR Resolutions, China and US vote, and Target Country,  
  1992-2014 ...........................................................................................................70
<Appendix 2> Descriptive Statistics ..............................................................78
<Appendix 3> List of African Countries in Statistical Analyses ...............79
iv
Abstract in Korean ...............................................................................................81
v
Tables
<Table Ⅲ-1> Stages of Norm Diffusion
<Table Ⅲ-2> OHCHR Regional Office in Africa
<Table Ⅲ-3> Statistics of South Africa




<Figure Ⅰ-1> Economic Dependence on China and Voting Similarity with 
China on UNHR Resolutions among African Countries, 
1992-2014
<Figure Ⅲ-1> Cumulative Numbers of ICC Ratifiers, 1998-2014
<Figure Ⅲ-2> African Countries’ Contribution to UN Peace Keeping 
Mission, 1990-2014 
<Figure Ⅲ-3> South Africa’s Economic Dependence and Voting Similarity 
with China, 1992-2014
<Figure Ⅲ-4> ICC and Non-ICC Members' Voting Similarity with China on 
UNHR Resolutions, 1992-2014
<Figure Ⅲ-5> Aid Money to Africa from the US and China, 1992-2014
1
Ⅰ. Introduction 
1. China’s Charm Offensive and Human Rights in Africa 
Since the late 1950s, China has actively sought to forge closer economic 
ties with African countries. China has prioritized its diplomatic relationships 
with Africa based on its long ideational longing to build “solidarity among 
the Third World countries”1) and to strengthen its positions as a major 
power within international politics. Recently, China’s engagement in Africa 
became more aggressive than before, dubbed as “charm offensive”; China 
overtook the US as Africa’s largest trading partner in 20092) and pledged to 
give 60 billion dollars aid to assist Africa’s development.3) China also 
organized a multilateral forum with African countries, the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has held two summits (2006 and 
2015) and six ministerial conferences so far. 
As Sino-African relationship deepened, scholars of international 
relations started to ponder whether China’s “charm offensive” can change 
regional political orders in Africa, which has been dominated by western 
powers.4) In case of Sino-African trade, the room for Chinese political 
1) Yun Sun, “China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Competition and Diplomacy”, 
Brookings Institutions, April 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/04/chi
na-africa-us-competition-diplomacy-sun 
2) Luke Patey and Zhang Chun, “China, trade, aid and Africa”, Financial Times, March 
11, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e05c6154-a90b-11e3-9b71-00144feab7de.html#ax
zz4225onHOF  (Accessed April 19, 2016).
3) Norimitsu Onishi, “Pledges 60 Billion to Aid Africa’s Development”, New York Times, 
Dec 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/world/africa/china-pledges-60-billion-to
-aid-africas-development.html?_r=0   (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
4) Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and 
Consequences,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 44, Issue. 3 (2006). pp. 
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power is large because there exists asymmetrical power relationship: for 
many African countries China is one of top trading countries, whereas China 
trade heavily with many countries outside Africa. If we turn our attention to 
investment and bilateral aid from China to Africa, the room for political 
power is even larger. Unlike trade, bilateral aid and investment creates a 
highly visible asymmetric relationship between the donor and the recipient. 
China’s investment in infrastructure development in Africa, mostly delivered 
by various Chinese lending agencies, is increasing rapidly. The head of 
Eximbank announced in 2013 that China will provide 1 trillion USD by 
2025 in the form of direct investments, soft loans and commercial loans. As 
the official clearly stated, “Africa for the next 20 years will be the 
single-most important business destination for many Chinese mega 
corporations.”5) 
In particular, the growing Chinese influence among African countries 
generates a grave concern regarding human rights-related issues. This is 
because economic assistance from China is seen to weaken the strife against 
human rights violations led by international organizations and western 
countries. For example, China’s investment and aid to Zimbabwe has been 
criticized to give a breathing space to the Mugabe regime, which has been 
isolated by international aid agencies and western countries for its human 
rights violations. In return, Mugabe repeatedly expressed appreciation for 
China’s economic support and adopted Chinese yuan as a legal currency in 
459-479; Ali Zafar, “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, and Aid Links,” World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 
22, Issue. 1 (2007), pp. 103-130; Ian Taylor, “Sino-African Relations and the Problem 
of Human Rights,” African Affairs, Vol. 107 (2008), pp. 63-87; Giles Mohan and 
Marcus Power, “New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement,” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35 (2008), pp. 23-42.




There is no doubt that China would not shy away from turning her 
economic power into political influence regarding human rights agenda. She 
would do so especially in terms of voting on country-specific human rights 
(hereafter UNHR) resolutions in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). China 
thinks that UNHR resolutions intervene too much in domestic issues of 
individual states and thus endeavors to defeat these resolutions. Since the 
early 1990s, China has consistently defended non-interference policies and 
demanded that human rights issues be considered as internal affairs of 
states.7) In the UNGA sessions, delegates of China has adamantly asserted 
that each country has a right to choose its own social system, including 
human rights.8) Recent statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry clearly claims 
that China has a “consistent position of opposing country specific resolutions 
on human rights ... the Chinese delegation has always held that countries 
should seek to resolve their differences in the field of human rights.”9) Not 
6) China Daily, “Zimbabwe praises China's technology transfer,” May 10, 2012, 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-05/10/content_15258768.htm (Accessed April 19, 
2016); The Guardian, “Zimbabwe to make Chinese yuan legal currency after Beijing 
cancels debts” December 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/zimb
abwe-to-make-chinese-yuan-legal-currency-after-beijing-cancels-debts (Accessed April 19, 
2016); The Guardian, “Robert Mugabe greets China's Xi Jinping as 'true and dear 
friend' of Zimbabwe” December 2, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/0
2/robert-mugabe-greets-chinas-xi-jinping-as-true-and-dear-friend-of-zimbabwe (Accessed 
April 19, 2016). 
7) Ann Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 
8) Foreign Ministry PRC, “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan at the 54th Session of the UN 
General Assembly,” 2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/
3604_665547/t18058.shtml (Accessed April 19, 2016).  .
9) Foreign Ministry PRC, “Statement by Ms. Zhang Dan, Counselor of the Chinese 
Delegation, at the 3rd Committee of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on 
Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution L.25 (Situation of Human 
Rights in DPRK)”, November 19 2009, www.china-un.org (Accessed April 19, 2016), 
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surprisingly, vote records in the UNGA show that China has consistently 
voted against or abstained from UNHR resolutions (See Appendix 1).  
China’s interest in defeating UNHR resolutions is understandable when 
we consider that China has been occasionally subjected to a condemnatory 
resolution on the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) or its 
sub-Commissions in 1990-2004.10) To defeat the introduction of the 
resolutions targeting herself, China has strived to mobilize support from 
developing countries, especially African countries, in the commission.11) It 
seems that to minimize the possibility of UNHR  resolutions targeting China 
being passed, not only does China vote no to other UNHR resolutions in 
general but also persuades other developing countries to vote against these 
resolutions. Recent studies find that African and Latin American countries 
trading more with China are more likely align with China in opposing 
country-specific human rights resolutions in the UNGA.12) Accordingly, in 
order to gain support for non- interventionist principles towards human 
rights, China is utilizing its economic power to persuade others vote against 
UNHR resolutions in general. 
Thus, voting on UNHR resolutions provides a rare opportunity to see 
whether China can transform her charm offensive into political influences on 
African countries as western observers worry. 
quoted in Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 358.
10) Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States, “US won’t rap 
China on human rights,” 18 March 2005, www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgrq/t188036.h
tm (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
11) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-375.
12) Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: the Global Community and the Struggle over 
Human Rights in China (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 178, 194.
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2. Research Question 
Discussions in the previous section indicate that Chinese economic power 
exerts considerable political influence on African countries’ positions in 
human rights diplomacy. However, recent phenomenon contrasts this existing 
argument. When extending the time frame to the period 1992-2014, the 
political influence of Chinese economic ties with African countries, measured 
by voting similarity between African countries and China on UNHR 
resolutions, started to wane around 2002. Figure I-1 shows that African 
countries start to support UNHR resolutions despite the fact that the amount 
of trade with China and Chinese aid has ever more increased after 2002. 
This declining effect of Chinese charm offensive in African region is 
intriguing given that Sino-African relations are amicable compared to those 
of East Asian and Latin American regions. Unlike Sino-East Asian relations. 
Sino-African relations are not fraught with historical animosities or territorial 
conflicts which would diminish the effect of Chinese charm offensive 
strategies. Nor are Sino-African ties are strongly influenced by US military 
influences that exert a significant impact on Latim American countries. In 
this regard, if Chinese charm offensive strategies do not work well in 
African region that provides most hospitable environment to China’s soft 
power diplomacy, Chinese charm offensive strategies may not be able to 
yield its intened results as Western observers conjecture. 
This recent trend in African region presents an interesting research 
question that should be scrutinized. Yet the previous literature has not 
examined this phenomenon in question. My dissertation therefore tries to 
answer an empirical puzzle of why have China's economic incentives lost its 
political influence in Africa regarding human rights diplomacy. Answering 
this research question would not only enhance our understanding on political 
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influence of emerging Chinese economic power but also shed light on future 
implications of China’s economic rise. 
<Figure Ⅰ-1> Economic Dependence and Voting Similarity with China, 
1992-2014: Note. Chinese trade salience and Chinese aid measured as the amount 
of bilateral trade and aid as a share of recipients’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Voting similarity with China is measured based on Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013). 
Source. Based on UNGA Voting Data from Voeten, “Data Analyses of Voting in 
the UN General Assembly,” in Bob Reinalda (eds.), Routledge Handbook of 
International Organization (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), pp. 54-66. Trade data 
from COW International Trade, IMF Direction of Trade and World Bank 
Development Indicators. Chinese aid data from Austin M. Strange, Axel Dreher, 
Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks and Michael J. Tierney, “Tracking Underreported 
Financial Flows: China’s Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Visited,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming). pp. 1-29. 
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3. Argument and Method 
This dissertation aims to explain the puzzle of diminishing political influence 
of China in Africa. This paper suggest this empirical question cannot be 
solved by the arguments made by the existing literature on political 
influence of strong states’ economic incentives. Instead, my dissertation 
argues that the rapid diffusion of international human rights norm, which 
challenges the traditional concept of sovereignty and non-intervention 
principles, is responsible for the change in African countries’ voting on 
UNHR resolutions. A series of events such as the institutionalization of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and 
Human Rights Council (HRC) in the UN, which happened during the period 
of China’s charm offensive in Africa, created a tipping point in human 
rights norm diffusion around the early 2000s. Growing emphasis on 
interventionist approaches towards human rights issues led to the increase in 
normative pressures to support UNHR resolutions as well. As a result of 
this normative pressures, more and more African countries began to vote for 
UNHR resolutions in spite of increasing economic assistance from China.  
This paper employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to 
support my argument. First, to discuss the effect of norm diffusion on UN 
voting pattern of African countries, I utilize various sources ranging from 
news articles, academic journals and statements from the UN and member 
states. I conduct case study on South Africa to illustrate how norm diffusion 
significantly influence UN voting pattern of countries who have forged close 
political and economic ties with China. During the period 2000-2014, South 
Africa’s stance has changed from opposing UNHR resolutions to neutral 
despite that maintaining cooperative relationship with China was strategically 
important to South Africa and constitutes its core national interests. This 
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change was attributable to normative criticisms on South Africa’s voting 
behavior on UNHR resolutions. South Africa was more constrained by the 
criticisms as they revealed the inconsistency between South Africa’s voting 
pattern and its previous commitment to emerging human rights norm such as 
participating in the ICC and HRC. 
For statistical analyses, this paper uses time-series cross-national data 
set covering 46 African countries over 21 years (1992-2012). Detailed 
information of the variables used in this dissertation will be introduced in 
the following chapters. To substantiate my argument that normative pressures 
within the international society overwhelm China’s soft power diplomacy in 
terms of African countries’ voting on UNHR resolutions, I utilize the 
variation in the membership of the ICC and HRC in African countries as an 
empirical leverage. 
Two mechanisms of norm diffusions could explain the effect of ICC 
and HRC membership on UNHR voting. First, participation in these two 
organizations signals countries' commitment to support interventionist 
approaches to resolve domestic human rights problems of states. As a result 
of their commitment, ICC and HRC members receive more pressure from 
domestic and external audience to act in accordance with the committed 
norm. Because the content of UNHR resolutions represents the very same 
norms supported by the ICC and HRC, member states face the cost of 
losing its legitimacy within the international community when not supporting 
UNHR resolutions. In this regard, when normative pressures on UNHR 
resolutions voting began to increase the early 2000s, countries with ICC and 
HRC membership would more readily vote in favour of UNHR resolutions. 
Second, affinity towards emerging human rights norm could also play 
its role on UNHR voting. It is also possible that some ICC and HRC 
would support UNHR resolutions because they believe in moral 
righteousness of emerging human rights norm. Therefore, as an extension of 
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showing their support for emerging human rights norm rather than a concern 
for the cost of their commitment, ICC and HRC members would vote in 
favour of UNHR resolutions.
Considering the aforementioned mechanisms of norm diffusion, this 
paper suggests two hypotheses. First, holding all other things constant, ICC 
and HRC members would more readily vote in favour of UNHR resolutions. 
Second, during the period 1992-2002, the effect of ICC and HRC 
membership would not be significant whereas Chinese trade would.
10
Ⅱ. Economic Dependence and Political Influence: 
Literature Review 
Recent discussions on the relationship between emerging Chinese economic 
power and its political influence on developing countries have their roots on 
classical debates about foreign policy consequences of strong states. Scholars 
in international political economy have long scrutinized how trade 
relationship with a strong country compel its counterpart small countries to 
follow foreign policy objectives of the strong state.13) Hirschman argued that 
trade disparities create opportunity costs (income loss and adjustment costs) 
in economic relationships which induces both trade partners to adjust their 
foreign policies and forge cooperative diplomatic ties.14) Keohane and Nye 
reinforced Hirschman’s argument and suggested that asymmetrical trade 
interdependence between a strong country and small country becomes a 
source of political power for the strong country.15) Recent theories on 
13) Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Bcerkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1945); Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power 
and the Structure of International Trade” World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 317-347; 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Independence, 2nd edition (New 
York, NY: Longman, 1977); Kal Holsti, “A New International Politics? Diplomacy in 
Complex Interdependence,” International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1978), pp. 
513-530; Richard Rosecrane, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest 
in the Modern World (New York, NY: Simple Books, 1986); Harrison R. Wagner, 
“Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence,” International 
Organization, Vol. 42, Issue. 3 (1988), pp. 461-483; Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan 
Kirshner, “Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 9, Issue. 5, pp. 119-156; Jonathan Kirshner, “The Consequence 
of China’s Economic Rise,” “The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise” in Ross, 
R. S. & Feng, Z. (Eds.), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of 
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 238–259.
14) Hirschman, 1945. 
15) Keohane and Nye, 1977. 
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asymmetrical trade dependence focus on the role of domestic constituencies 
and argue that deepening bilateral trade relationship gives more power to 
constituencies who advocate favorable diplomatic relations between two 
countries.16)
This classical argument now extends to question on whether increasing 
Chinese trade and aid induce developing countries in general to support 
Chinese foreign policies. There are now burgeoning studies on this research 
question.17) First, there are researchers who claim that countries receiving 
more Chinese aid and trade tend to take foreign policy stance that is 
favorable to China. Flores-Macías and Kreps measure countries’ alignment 
with Chinese foreign policies based on UNHR resolutions and suggest that 
during the period 1992-2006 increase in bilateral trade with China led 
developing countries to vote against UNHR resolutions and support Chinese 
position on these resolutions.18) Strüver uses overall UNGA vote records and 
find some evidence that not only aid dependence from China but also 
regime similarity, diplomatic ties and shared international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) memberships with China could influence developing 
countries’ alignment with Chinese foreign policies.19)
Other studies take nuanced stance, suggesting that political effect of 
16) Abdelal and Kirshner, 2000, pp. 119-156; Kirshner, 2008, pp. 238-359. 
17) Gustavo A. Flores-Macías and Sarah E. Kreps, “The Foreign Policy Consequences of 
Trade: China’s Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992-2006,” 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 75, Issue. 2 (2013), pp. 357-371; David Shambaugh, China 
Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Scott L. 
Kastner, “Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China’s International 
Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, (2014), pp. 1-28, http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/
early/2014/12/26/0022002714560345.abstract (Accessed April 19, 2016); Georg Strüver, 
“What Friends are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign 
Policy Alignment with China,” Foreign Policy Analysis (2014), pp. 1-22, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fpa.12050/abstract (Accessed April 19, 2016)
18) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371. 
19) Strüver, 2014, pp. 1-21.
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Chinese economic power depends on the issue areas and specific types of 
economic incentives. Shambaugh argues that although the projection of 
Chinese economic power has increased globally over the past three decades, 
China’s global presence falls short of being a major power and hence China 
should be referred as a ‘partial power.’ Although China endeavors to build 
her soft power, her efforts are often limited due to domestic political 
constraints and lack of coherent contribution to global governance.20) Kastner 
finds that among different types of trade dependence indicator, import 
dependence on China is more likely to generate compliance from developing 
countries on foreign policy issues. Moreover, countries trading more with 
China would easily follow China on economic issues but not on political 
issues such as independence of Taiwan and Tibet.21)
While the aforementioned research derives implications of China’s soft 
power diplomacy on developing countries across different regions, other 
studies focus on regional implications of China’s rise and examine variations 
across countries’ behavior in the region. First, there are studies that focus 
on how East Asian countries respond to the rise of China’s economic 
power.22) Since East Asian region is geographically proximate to China and 
20) Shambaugh, 2013. 
21) Goh, 2014, pp. 825-848. 
22) Robert Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and 
Balancing in East Asia,” Security Studies, Vol. 15, Issue. 3 (2006), pp. 119-156; 
David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008); Evan Medeiros, Keith Crane, 
Eric Heginbotham, Norman Levin, Julia Lowell, Angel Rabasa, and Somi Seong, 
Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to 
China’s Rise (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2008); Young Nam Cho and Jae Ho 
Chung, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects” Asian Survey, 
Vol. 48, Issue. 3 (2008), pp. 453-472; Jae Ho Chung, “East Asia Responds to the 
Rise of China: Patterns and Variations” Pacific Affairs. Vol. 82, Issue. 4 (2009), pp. 
657-675; Evelyn Goh, “The Modes of China’s Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 54, Issue. 5 (2014), pp. 825-848; Pascal Abb and Goerg Strüver, 
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has enduring historical memories, East Asian countries’ reaction to deepening 
economic relationship with China has been diverse across time and policy 
issues. Cho and Chung argue that soft power strategies, based on the 
Chinese developmental model, foreign policies with emphasis on ‘peaceful 
rise’ and Chinese civilization, has been a major stake for China in the 
post-Cold War era and these strategies have significantly contributed to the 
postive image of China among Asian countries.23) Mederios et al. attempt 
case studies and find that Japanese business elites, wanting to maintain 
heightened trade relationships with Chinese counterparts, pushed their 
government to take more pro-Chinese stance on foreign policy issues.24) Abb 
and Strüver examine Sino-Southeast Asian relations during the period 
1972-2010 and suggest that Southeast Asian countries’ support for Chinese 
foreign policies in the UNGA depends on the cooperative bilateral regional 
relationships and trade dependence on China. Their findings imply that the 
Cold War era and alliance with the US had negative effect on countries’ 
support for Chinese positions in global affairs.25)
On the other hand, some researchers doubt that Chinese trade and aid 
could exert significant influence on East Asian countries. These studies 
frequently point out that the effect of China’s charm offensive would not 
hold when states feel threatened by China’s military rise. Accordingly, states 
could be wary of China's military capabilities and resist political pressure 
made by China based on growing volume of trade and aid. For instance, 
Ross examines the case of East Asian countries and conclude that increasing 
“Regional Linkages and Global Policy Alignment: The Case of China-Southeast Asia 
Relations,” GIGA Working Paper (2015), Vol. 268, pp. 1-31; Darren J. Lim and Zack 
Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security 
Studies, Vol. 24, Issue. 4 (2015), pp. 696-727. 
23) Cho and Chung, 2008, pp. 453-472. 
24) Medeiros et al., 2008. 
25) Abb and Strüver, 2015, pp. 1-31. 
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Chinese trade does not induce states to support Chinese foreign policies in 
this region.26) Because of their historical relationship with China, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan feel threatened by growing Chinese military capabilities 
and would balance against rather than accommodate China. In line with this 
argument, Goh suggests that even though China's economic resources have 
increased in Southeast Asian region, its influence on these countries is not 
always significant.27) Accordingly, they would be willing to cooperate for 
economic regionalism that is mutually beneficial. In case of maritime 
disputes, however, China fails to make Southeast Asian states to act in 
accordance with Chinese policies: these countries have a considerable 
interests in securing territories in South China Sea and would not give up 
their national interests. Recently heightened tensions between Southeast Asian 
countries and China has led them to be more wary of Chinese intention.  
Studies focusing on China’s rise in East Asian region also examines 
what factors contribute for variations in secondary states’ response to 
China’s growing power. Notably, Chung analyzes countries’ behavior towards 
China during the period 2004-2007 based on bandwagoning-balancing 
spectrum and suggest that their different attitudes are mostly influenced by 
alliance with the US.28) Lim and Cooper further argue that East Asian 
countries who are US military allies or have territorial conflicts with China 
are more likely to balance against China.29)
To study implications of China’s charm offensive strategies, researchers 
also focus on cases in African region where China has put a considerable 
effort to build cooperative diplomatic ties with developing countries.30)   
26) Ross, 2006, pp. 119-156.  
27) Goh, 2014, pp. 825-848.
28) Chung, 2009, pp. pp. 657-675. 
29) Lim and Cooper, 2015, pp. 696-727.
30) Ian Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa” International Affairs, Vol. 82, Issue. 5 
(2006), pp. 937-959; Tull, 2006, pp. 459-479; Taylor, 2008, pp. 63-87; Mohan and 
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Tull points out that China’s increased involvement in African region is 
against the idea of international marginalization of African countries and 
growing China’s interest in the region reflects her foreign policy strategy 
based on multi-polarity and non-intervention policies.31) Taylor argues that 
China’s charm offensive strategies in Africa also concerns increasing 
domestic demand for oil and long-term goal of positioning herself as a 
major player in the international oil market.32) 
Despite growing volume of research on Sino-African relations, 
however, current studies fall short of demonstrating concrete and detailed 
stories of Chinese impact on African countries. In this regard, Mohan and 
Power argue that Sino-African relations are contextual and complex, which 
suggest a need for detailed case studies and reveal dynamic relationship 
between individual African countries and China.33) The recent work of 
Brautigam conducts field works and numerous interviews in China and 
Africa, and challenge the notion that China’s engagement in Africa is 
motivate by short-term economic and strategic interests. Instead, she argues 
that China is actually interested in promoting the lesson she learned from 
her own development process and considers about how to build mutually 
Power, 2008, pp. 23-42; Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of 
China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Axel Dreher, Andreas 
Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange and Michael J. Tierney, “Apples and 
Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from 
China to Africa,” AidData (2015), pp. 1-32, http://aiddata.org/sites/default/files/wps15_a
pples_and_dragon_fruits.pdf  (Accessed April 19, 2016); Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, 
Roland Hodler, Bradley C. Parks, Paul A. Raschky and Michael J. Tierney, “Aid on 
Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,” Center 
on Economic Policy Research (2015), pp. 1-52, https://drive.google.com/fle/d/0B4w0pB
eo3NLZazJqNFlJTjZ1Tmk2d3Q1d3RlZ1hOanViV0lV/view?pref=2&pli=1 (Accessed, April 
19, 2016).
31) Tull, 2006, pp. 459-479.
32) Taylor, 2006, pp. 937-959.
33) Mohan and Power, 2008, pp. 23-42
16
beneficial relationship in Africa.34)
Recently, there have been attempts to quantitatively examine the effect 
of Chinese aid and trade on foreign policy positions of African countries. 
Based on their media-based source of Chinese aid data, Dreher, Fuchs, 
Parks, Strange and Tierney find that during the period 2000-2013 the 
amount of Chinese ODA allocated to African countries are associated with 
recipients' UN voting alignment with China and their position vis-a-vis 
One-China policy. On the other hand, distribution of less concessional 
official aid was associated with economic consideration.35) Dreher, Fuchs, 
Hodler, Parks, Raschky and Tierney further argue that Chinese aid is more 
likely to be allocated to the birth region of African political leaders.36) Their 
finding implies that Chinese aid can be utilized in a way desired by African 
elites and thus African countries who receive more official aid from China 
are more likely to comply with Chinese foreign policies to receive more 
aid. These studies also indicate that increasing bilateral trade with China 
influences positions of developing states in terms of broader foreign issues 
such as overall UNGA vote with China.37)
There are also studies on how China’s rise would influence foreign 
policies of Latin American region.38) These studies question whether China’s 
34) Brautigam, 2009. 
35) Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-32. 
36) Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-52. 
37) Kastner, 2014, pp. 1-28. 
38) Gonzalo Sebastián Paz, “China, United Nations and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin 
American: An Overview and Some Lessons from Previous Instances of Hegemonic 
Challenge in the Region” China Quarterly, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 18-34; Rhys Jenkins 
and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, “ Fear for Manufacturing? China and the Future 
of Industry in Brazil and Latin America,” China Quarterly, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 
59-81; Julia C. Strauss, “Framing and Claiming: Contemporary Globalization and 
Going Out in China’s Rhetoric towards Latin America,” China Quarterly, Vol. 209 
(2012), pp. 134-156; Hongying Wang, “The Missing Link in Sino-Latim American 
Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 24, Issue. 95 (2015), pp. 922-942.
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rise would challenge US dominancy or domestic industries in the region. 
They also question how people and governments in Latin America perceive 
China’s growing share in global market. Because of being a region relatively 
less important to China, compared to East Asian and African regions there 
are not many studies on China’s charm offensive strategies in Latim 
American region.  
In sum, the existing research on the relationship between Chinese 
economic power and foreign policy convergence reaches different conclusions 
depending on countries and issue areas in observation. Their findings imply 
that various factors should be taken into account when examining dynamic 
relationship between China and secondary states across the regions. 
Nonetheless, current studies on foreign policy consequences of Chinese 
economic power face two limitations. First, they primarily focus on material 
aspects of international politics such as aid money or material capabilities. 
The existing research emphasizes economic incentives that strong states can 
give to developing countries or military capabilities that could arouse threat 
perceptions among secondary states. This perspective neglects other important 
aspects of international politics, such as shared norm or role of multilateral 
institutions that came to play a decisive role in the post-Cold war era. 
These normative and institutional factors could also alter behavior of states 
within the international community. These factors would be especially 
important when discussing the impact of China’s charm offensive strategies 
on human rights diplomacy in Africa. Yet until now studies addressing 
human rights issues in Sino-Africa relations did not question how diffusion 
of international human rights norm in the post-Cold War era could constrain 
the effect of Chinese trade and aid on foreign policies of African countries. 
The second limitation of the previous literature is that much of the 
attention is paid to East Asian region compared to African and Latin 
American countries. In case of Sino-African relations, there are limitations in 
18
data accessibility and this constrained researchers to examine in detail the 
effect of China’s charm offensive strategies in the region. 
My dissertation aims to overcome the aforementioned limitations of 
the existing research on political influence of China’s charm offensive For 
one, my dissertation demonstrates that normative and institutional factors can 
also influence China’s charm offensive strategy, whereas the previous 
literature focused solely on the effect of economic and military factors. 
Second, by focusing on the impact of Chinese trade and aid on human 
rights issues in Africa which has not been sufficiently researched, this paper 
intends to show in detail dynamics of Sino-African relations.
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III. Norm Diffusion and Limits of China’s Charm 
Offensive 
1. International Human Rights Norm Diffusion
To account for decreasing leverage of China's economic ties in Africa, this 
paper considers normative aspects of international politics that play a more 
dominant role in the post-Cold War era: the diffusion of international human 
rights norms that bind states' behavior. According to the constructivist IR 
approach, international relations are not solely shaped by power and 
interests. What is equally important is shared normative understandings 
among states.39) In this sense, states could conform to international norms 
without explicit interests or material gains. Recent studies analyze how 
diffusion of norm –such as human rights, international election monitoring, 
women’s rights and accountability norm for individual leaders- occur and 
change behavior of states.40) The literature further points out how non-state 
39) Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Andrew P. Cortell and James 
W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research 
Agenda,” International Studies Review, Vol. 2, Issue. 1 (2001), pp. 65-90; Jacqui 
True and Michael Mintrom, “Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case 
of Gender Mainstreaming,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, Issue. 1 (2001), 
pp. 27-57.
40) Judith Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International 
Election Monitoring,” International Organization, Vol. 62, Issue. 2 (2008), pp. 
221-255; Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins, “A Funny Thing Happened on the Way 
to Rome: Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations,” Journal of Politics, 
Vol. 71, Issue. 3 (2009), pp. 977-997; Sarah S. Bush, “International Politics and the 
Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures,” International Organization, Vol. 65 
(2011), pp. 103-137; Suan D. Hyde, “Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and 
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actors such as non-governmental organization (NGOs) and International 
Organizations (IOs) could serve to socialize states to comply with 
international norms.41)    
The sudden change in African countries' UN voting behavior reflects 
the diffusion of international human rights norms that challenges the 
traditional concept of sovereignty and non-intervention principles. The 
process of this norm diffusion can be divided into three phases: norm 
emergence, norm cascade and norm internationalization. Table Ⅲ-1 
summarizes characteristics of each stage. First, in norm emergence stage, 
norm entrepreneurs, mainly non-state actors within international organizations, 
drive the development of new norms and persuade others to accept the new 
norm. At the tipping point, sufficient number of states accept new norms to 
redefine the appropriate behavior within the international community. 
Following tipping point comes the stage of norm cascades during which 
International Norm Diffusion,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2 
(2011), pp. 356-369; Jay Goodliffe, Christine Horne and Daniel L. Neilson, 
“Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 56 (2012), pp. 131-147; Hun Joon Kim and Jason C. Sharman, 
“Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual 
Accountability Norms,” International Organization, Vol. 68, Issue. 2 (2014), pp. 
417-448.  
41) Martha Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Oragnization and Science Policy,” 
International Organization, Vol. 47, Issue. 4 (1993), pp. 565-597; Martha Finnemore, 
National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1996); Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary 
Europe,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43 (1999), pp. 83-114; Alexandru 
Grigorescu, “European Institutions and Unsuccessful Norm Transmission: The Case of 
Transparency,” International Politics, Vol. 39 (2002), pp. 457-489; Brian Greenhill, 
“The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human 
Rights Norms,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2010), pp. 127-145; Daniela 
Donno, “Who is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the 
Enforcement of Democratic Norms,” International Organization, Vol. 64, Issue. 4 
(2010), pp. 593-625. 
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norm-complying states, non-governmental actors, and multilateral institutions 
compel other states to endorse emerging human rights norms.42) In this 
stage, socialization mechanism such as diplomatic praising or condemnation 
from norm-complying states or multilateral institutions is used in order to 
bring about norm conformity.43) Lastly, during norm internalization, norms 
are so widely spreaded that states are taken for granted and everyone acts 
according to the norm. 
In case of international norm of interventionist principles on human 
right issues, the period of the 1990s can be referred as norm emergence 
stage. The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the international 
political landscape and has allowed the UN to actively pursue an indivisible 
and universal approach towards human rights.44) Under the phrase "human 
rights for all", there emerged an idea that collective actions are required to 
resolve human rights abuses of individual states. Accordingly, UN should 
not only prioritize human rights as its goals but also seek measure to 
effectively protect human rights over the world. The creation of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) was also discussed. During this period, 
however, discussions were not linked to active measures to induce states to 
respect interventionist approaches towards human rights agenda. 
42) Finnemore and Skkink, 1998, pp. 887-917. 
43) In the words of Waltz, socialization occurs in the form of praising norm compliers, 
ridiculing the deviation and emulating heroes. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
44) Jean-Philippe Thérien and Philippe Joly, “All Human Rights for All: The United 
Nations and Human Rights in the Post-Cod War Era,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 



































<Table Ⅲ-1> Stages of Norm Diffusion:  Source. Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Skkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization, Vol. 52, Issue. 4 (1998), pp. 898.
The diffusion of new international human rights norms met its 
momentum in the early 2000s. During this period a critical mass of state 
and non-state actors adopted the emerging human rights norm and pressured 
other states to conform to the new norm. This critical moment can be 
referred as "tipping point" and the following stage of norm diffusion as 
"norm cascades". This norm cascade has been undergoing since the year 
2001 and norm internalization is yet to be realized.45) 
The period around the early 2000s served as the tipping point at 
45) Finnemore and Skkink, 1998, pp. 887-917. 
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which pressures to abide by new international human rights norm increased. 
After the 9/11 attacks, the UN actively pushed for new human rights 
initiatives that could eliminate root causes of terrorism and this meant that 
domestic human rights problems of individual states would be more actively 
discussed within the UN.46) EU countries without hesitation embraced the 
new norm since exporting values of democracy and human rights has been 
their foreign policy concern for some years.47) In Africa, the notion of 
collective responsibility to human rights was already starting to develop as 
countries began to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
People’s Right in the late 1990s and adopted the Constitutive Act in 2000 
to found African Union (AU).48) 
The process of these growing acceptance of new norm was clearly 
visible within the international community. In December 2002, Optional 
Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (OP-CAT), which 
unprecedently takes preventive measures towards human rights abuses of 
states by allowing outside experts to visit the place of detention, was 
adopted with 127 countries voting in favour of, 4 countries against and 42 
countries abstaining.  Moreover, during the period 2000-2002, the ratification 
46) See, United Nations, Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and 
Terrorism, U.NGA 57th Session., Item 162, Provisional Agenda, at 2, UN Doc. 
A/57/273-S/2002/875 (2002).
47) European Commission, “The Stabilization and Association Process and CARDS 
Assistance 2002 to 2006” (2006), http://www.seerecon.org/region/documents/ec/ec_sap_c
ards_2000-2006.pdf (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
48) The Constitutive Act states the right of African countries to intervene in domestic 
affairs of other member states and this interventionist policy distinguishes the AU 
from the previous regional organization, Organization of African Unity (OAU). Bience 
Gawanas, “The African Union: Concepts and Implementation Mechanisms Relating to 
Human Rights,” in A. Bosl and J. Diescho (eds.), Human Rights in Africa 
(Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 2009), pp. 135-163. 
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rate of the ICC surged: more or less 60 countries ratified the ICC treaty 
and this indicates that tipping point and norm cascades stage for new 
international human rights norm occurred during that period (Figure Ⅲ-1). 
Establishing the ICC in the late 1990s was a milestone decision in which 
states for the first time allowed the enforceable international institution to 
have a right to sanction domestic human rights abuses of states.49) 
<Figure Ⅲ-1> Cumulative Numbers of ICC Ratifiers, 1998-2014: Source. 
ICC website, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pag
es/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx 
(Accessed April 19, 2016). 
49) Darren Hawkins, “Explaining Constly International Institutions: Persuasion and 
Enforceable Human Rights Norms,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48 (2004), 
pp. 779-804; Nichole Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting 
Islands of Persuasion in the ICC Case,” International Organization, Vol. 63, Issue. 1 
(2009), pp. 33-65. 
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The efforts to strengthen the institutionalization of R2P also increased 
during this period. Responding to the call from the UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan to strengthen the international effort to build up ‘humanitarian 
intervention in 1999 and 2000, International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) was founded to develop a broader international 
support for institutional frameworks of humanitarian intervention.50) The 
result of the Commission was a document Responsibility to Protect in 2001 
and the report all the more intended to legitimize new interventionist norms.  
In addition, the UN established the HRC in 2006 in order to replace the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) that was criticized as ineffective. The 
newly founded HRC actively sought to promote human rights of member 
states by releasing Universal Periodic Review that keeps track of each 
country's human rights compliance and UN voting records. 
As more and more countries adopted the emerging interventionist 
principles regarding human rights issues, voting in favour of UNHR 
resolutions, which address human rights abuses of individual states to be 
resolved within the international community, was also recognized as an 
important signal that countries abide by the new norm. As a result, there 
has been an increasing use of praising and condemnation to socialize states 
to take pro-human rights stance in UN voting. Notably, "naming and 
shaming" by the UN, member states and international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) became prevalent. Notable example comes from 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that are most renowned 
INGOs in human rights issues. During the 60th UNGA session in 2005, 
Amnesty International urged member states to take appropriate action to 
solve human rights situation in any country. Moreover, it expressed its deep 
concern about potential “no-action motions” in the Third Committee of the 
50) ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001).
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UNGA which would impede discussions on human rights situations in Iran, 
Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan.51) Human Rights Watch, another INGO 
recently released voting records within the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 
its VotesCount website. This allows a closer public monitoring of member 
states whose voting pattern fails to comply with the international human 
rights standard. 
Other INGOs also participate in pressuring countries to vote against 
UNHR resolutions. 25 NGOs sent letters to UNGA members to vote in 
favour of the resolution criticizing human rights abuses in Iran.52) The UN 
Watch, a non-governmental organization whose mandate is to monitor 
activities of the UN, has been active in addressing the list of countries who 
voted against country-specific human rights resolutions. The notable example 
is South Africa who has been criticized by the UN watch report that it 
does not support UN human rights agenda as promised and this incident 
received a considerable attention from the press.53) Other NGOs such as UN 
Watch and International Service for Human Rights also tracks voting records 
of individual countries on UNHR resolutions.54) Recently, UN Watch 
condemned countries such as Russia, China, Nicaragua, Venezuela and 
Ecuador for their contradictory behaviors of supporting UNHR resolutions 
targeting Israel while rejecting any other UNHR resolutions.55)
51) Human Rights House Network, “Six Nations Revolt Agianst UN Censure,” November 
23, 2005, http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/509.html (Accessed June 12, 2016).
52) Outright Action International, “25 NGOs Urge UN Third Committee to Pass Iran 
Human Rights Resolution,” 2013, https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/25-ngos-u
rge-un-third-committee-pass-iran-human-rights-resolution (Accessed June 16, 2016). 
53) UN Watch, “South Africa at the UN: Your Freedom and Mine,” 2007a, 
http://www.unwatch.org/south-africa-opposes-un-human-rights-resolutions/ (Accessed April 
19, 2016). 
54) ISHR, “Analysis of Voting on Country-Specific Resolutions,” Nov 29, 2011, 
http://www.ishr.ch/news/third-committee-update-analysis-voting-country-secific-resolutions 
(Accessed April 19, 2016).
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In Africa, normative pressures to support interventionist approaches 
towards human rights issues also increased around the early 2000s as 
African countries’ involvement in international human rights framework 
deepened during this period. Their participation in the international human 
rights regime reinforced as African countries realized that non-interference 
policies adopted by Organization of African Union fuelled civil wars and 
human rights abuses in the region.56) First, Office of High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) regional offices began to be established. OHCHR 
constitutes an important pillar of human rights framework within the UN. 
OHCHR is primarily responsible for helping governments to implement 
human rights standards on the ground and provide them with expertise and 
technical assistance. It also aims to add a human rights perspective to every 
UN programs and collaborate with other UN and International organizations 
such as International Labour Organization, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International 
Criminal Court, specialized criminal tribunals and the World Bank in their 
efforts to promote and protect human rights.  
As Table Ⅲ-2 shows, the timing of the establishment of OHCHR 
regional office in Africa is around the early 2000s. OHCHR regional office 
in Central African, East Africa and Southern Africa was founded during this 
period and this demonstrates that African countries’ involvement in 
55) UN Watch, “Hypocrisy at the UN: dictatorships reject county-specific resolutions, 
then adopt 22 country-specific resolutions on Israel,” December 3, 2012 
http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2012/12/03/hypocrisy-at-the-un-dictatorships-reject-count
ry-specific-resolutions-then-adopt-21-country-specific-resolutions-on-israel/ (Accessed 
June 16, 2016). 
56) The Citizen, “Non-Interference Enables Human Rights Violations: AU,” November 6, 
2015, http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Non-interference-enables-human-rights-violations—
AU/-/1840340/2945734/-/7u5sa6z/-/index.html (Accessed June 16, 2016).  
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international human rights institutions deepened. OHCHR regional office also 
aims to improve governance of African countries and make them abide by 
international human rights treaties. 
In terms of ICC, Africa was ardent supporters of establishing ICC. 
Along with efforts of African states, some 90 African organizations 
participated in NGO coalitions and strongly pushed for early establishment 
of independent and effective ICC.57) As shown in figure Ⅲ-1, during the 
period 1999-2001 10 countries ratified the treaty, whereas in the year 2002 
11 countries did. This pattern of ICC ratification in Africa resembles the 
overall pattern shown in figure Ⅲ-1. As a result, African countries 
constitute the largest number of ICC members to this date and the 
substantial number of ICC judges have been Africans. In addition, African 
countries are also a part of regional members of HRC. 
African countries have also been active participant in UN peace 
keeping missions. After the period of the mid 1990s during which multiple 
UN peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia, African 
countries’contribution to UN peace keeping missions began to increase in 
2000 (Figure Ⅲ-2). The timing overlaps with the call from the UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan to strengthen efforts to institutionalize R2P. 
The increased UN peace keeping contribution from African countries also 
reflects the surge in the number of UN peace keeping missions in African 
region such as Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Syria.
57) Phakiso Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, in E Ankumah 
and EKwakwa (eds), African perspectives on international criminal justice (Ghana: 






 Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, 
Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda,
Sao Tome and Principe
East
Africa




Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 





Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo
<Table Ⅲ-2> OHCHR Regional Office in Africa: Source. OHCHR website, 
http://www.uhchr..org (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
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<Figure Ⅲ-2> African Countries’ Contribution to UN Peace Keeping 
Mission, 1990-2014: Note. The data is collected on monthly basis, starting from 
November 1990. Contribution is measured as the total number of troops, police and 
observers. Source.  International Peace Institute, IPI Peacekeeping Database, 
www.providingforpeacekeeping.org (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
2. Norm Diffusion in Africa: Case Study of South Africa
This section presents case study of African countries and examines how 
diffusion of human rights norm pressured African states to change their 
voting decisions on UNHR　resolutions in the 2000s. Since we cannot cover 
all African countries, we analyze one country who have forged close 
economic and diplomatic ties with China: South Africa. South Africa is 
known to have sided with China on opposing UNHR resolutions and as 
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South Africa




ICC Member since 2000
HRC Member 2006-2010, 2014-2016
UN Peacekeeping since 1999
<Table Ⅲ-3> Statistics of South Africa. *Figure based on the year 2004. 
well as country-specific mandates in HRC. Moreover, South Africa is one of 
the top trading partners with China in African region. In this regard, the 
case of South Africa would reveal how normative pressures induce African 
states to support UNHR resolutions despite the existence of material payoffs 
that could be obtained by opposing UNHR resolutions. 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1998, South 
Africa and China has forged close bilateral political and economic ties. 
Recognizing strategic importance of its largest trading and investment partner 
in Africa, China established ‘strategic partnership featuring equality, mutually 
benefit and common development’ (平等友好, 共 發展的戰略伙伴關係, pingdeng 
youhao, gongtong fazhen de zhanlüe huoban guanxi) with South Africa in 
2004.58) It was the first time that China sought strategic partnership with 
58) China pursues strategic partnerships with countries which are more flexible than 
military alliances yet are mutually beneficial. See, Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic 
Partnership in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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African countries. In 2010, Sino-South African relations were elevated to 
‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (全面戰略伙伴關係, quanmian zhanlüe 
huoban guanxi).59) Again, South African became the first African country to 
establish such a close diplomatic link with China. To this date only Algeria 
and South Africa are labelled as comprehensive strategic partner of China. 
Deepening Sino-South Africa relations are confirmed as leaders of South 
Africa and China also frequently visit each other and confirms their 
enduring diplomatic relationship.
Figure Ⅲ-3 shows the trend of South Africa’s voting on UNHR 
resolutions and economic dependence with China. The volume of bilateral 
trade volume with China has been increasing and dramatically surged in the 
2010s. On the other hand, South Africa’s voting similarity with China on 
UNHR resolutions has been slow decreasing since the early 2000s. In the 
2010s, voting similarity scores are around 0.5 which implies that South 
Africa’s preferred to remain neutral on UNHR resolutions. The shift in 
South Africa’s voting decision comes at a surprise given that Sino-South 
African relations has been deepening since the early 2000s.  
59) Compared to the previous type of strategic partnership, this type includes an 
additional term ‘comprehensive’ (全面, quanmian) which implies that the scope of 
Sino-South African relations is widening. See, 葉自成, 李紅杰,『中國大外交: 摺衝樽
俎60年』 (北京: 當代世界出版社, 2009), pp. 252-253. 
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<Figure Ⅲ-3> South Africa’s Economic Dependence and Voting Similarity 
with China, 1992-2014. Note. Chinese trade salience and Chinese aid measured 
as the amount of bilateral trade and aid as a share of recipients’ Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Voting similarity with China is measured based on Flores-Macías 
and Kreps (2013). Source. Based on Voeten, 2013, pp. 54-66. Trade data from 
COW International Trade, IMF Direction of Trade and World Bank Development 
Indicators. 
South Africa’s positions on UNHR resolutions can be divided into 
several phases. The first phase took place in the 1990s. In 1994, South 
Africa was readmitted to the UN following transition from the system of 
apartheid to democracy. Under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, promotion 
of human rights seems to have become guiding principles of South Africa’s 
foreign policies. South Africa welcomed advisory and technical assistance 
from the UN and Center Human Rights at Geneva.60) The delegate of South 
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Africa also declared in the UNGA that its country was acceding to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other major international human 
rights instruments.61) During this period South Africa also actively sought to 
improve domestic human rights practices. In 1996, South African 
government adopted a new constitution that guarantee fundamental human 
rights, democratic values and social justice. The Parliament enacted the 
Promotion of National Unity Act and established a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. As a consequence South Africa’s voting with similarity with 
China on UNHR resolutions was low during this period. 
Notwithstanding the intial position on human rights issues in the UN, 
drastic turn in South Africa’s human rights diplomacy occurred in the 2000s. 
The official rhetoric of South Africa on human rights foreign policy has 
changed little during this period, as in 2004 Department of Foreign Affairs 
listed promotion of human rights and democracy as top foreign policy 
goals.62) South Africa even acceded to the ICC in 2000, began to participate 
in UN peacekeeping missions in 1999 and became a member of the HRC 
during the period 2006-2010. Nonetheless, actual practices of South African 
government were undermining principles of promoting international human 
rights. South Africa acquiesced extensive human rights abuses of neighboring 
state Zimbabwe. 
The pattern of UN voting in figure Ⅲ-2 shows that during the period 
2001-2005 voting similarity scores with China are above 0.5. This signifies 
that South Africa support China’s positions on UNHR resolutions. Its 
support for China in terns of human rights issues is reflected on its 
60) United Nations, Third Committee, “Summary Record of the 34th Meeting,” December 
8, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.34, pp. 13.  
61) United Nations, Third Committee, “Summary Record of the 36th Meeting,” November 
13, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/51/SR.36, p. 7
62) South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan, 2003-2005, March 2004, 
pp. 14. www.dfa.gov.za (Accessed June 14, 2016). 
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statement in the UNGA. In 2000, South Africa did vote in favour of 
UNHR resolutions targeting Sudan yet cautioned against adopting any 
unilateral coercive measure which were “likely to create obstacles to trade 
relations among States and impede the effective realization of human rights.” 
On behalf of Non-Alignment Group and China, the South African delegate 
also supported the resolution concerning human rights questions which 
proposes alternative approaches for the effective enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedom.63) In 2004, when discussing UNHR resolutions 
targeting Zimbabwe South Africa took a stronger stance and insisted on 
behalf of the African Group that the UN should not target only human 
rights abuses of developing states and that intransigent nature of UNHR 
resolutions would not be productive.64) This statement took place after the 
fourteenth ministerial conference for the Non-Aligned Group was held in 
South Africa.  
South Africa’s deviant behavior in human rights diplomacy was also 
observed in HRC and Security Council. During the creation of HRC. As 
one of HRC members, South Africa. In 2007, South Africa, China and 
Russia was the only members of the 15 Security Council members to 
oppose a resolution criticizing human rights situations in Myanmar. In HRC, 
South Africa deliberately obstructed progress of international human rights 
norm by opposing country-specific mandates and putting considerable efforts 
to weaken Universal Periodic Review.65)
This shift in South Africa’s behavior indicates that during this period 
South Africa’s foreign policy was mostly driven by the relationship with 
63) United Nations, 54th U.N.GA Session, Febuary 7, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/54/SR.55, 
pp. 5-6. 
64) United Nations, 59th U.N.Ga Session, November 30, 2004, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/59/SR.54, 
pp. 2. 
65) Eduard Jordaan, “South Africa and the United Nations Human Rights Council,” 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 36, Issue. 1 (2014), pp. 93-34. 
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other African countries and China. During this period South Africa’s national 
interests lie in securing cooperative relationship with developing countries 
and BRICs. Especially regarding China, presidents of South Africa visits 
China to affirm stable Sino-South African relations.66)  
Yet South Africa’s human rights policy within the UN underwent 
another change in the late 2000s. During this period, increase in the number 
of naming and shaming on South Africa’s UN voting pattern led South 
Africa to adjust its stance on human rights issues in the UN. The criticism 
towards South Africa within the international community surged in the year 
2007 and 2008. In 2007, UN Watch criticized South Africa for refusing to 
support UNHR resolutions within the Human Rights Council. Public opinion 
of South Africa went wild as numerous domestic media outlets reported the 
statement made by the UN Watch.67) The Economist reported that during its 
two years as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, South Africa 
aligned with authoritarian states to defeat every country-specific human rights 
resolutions.68) The criticism towards South Africa was harsher because South 
Africa did not respect its role in defending international human rights 
institutions despite of the fact that South Africa was involved in them and 
promised to fulfill its duties as responsible state actors.   
Figure Ⅲ-3 shows that in 2006-2008 when naming and shaming on 
South Africa became active, South Africa’s voting pattern on UNHR 
resolutions fluctuate. In 2007, although South Africa statement still concern 
that UNHR resolutions should be discussed in a non-political and 
66) “South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Human Rights? What’s That?” The Economist, 
October 14, 2014, http://www.economist.com/node/17259138 (Accessed June 14, 2016).
67) UN Watch, “South Africa’s Vote Against Human Rights,” November 19, 2007b, 
http://www.unwatch.org/south-africas-un-votes-against-human-rights/ (Accessed June 18, 
2016).
68) “The See-No-Evil Foreign Policy,” The Economist (November 13, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com (Accessed June 18, 2016). 
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non-selective manner,69) South Africa on the average remained neutral on 
UNHR resolutions. The voting decision in 2007 is especially notable given 
the fact that voting took place right after South Africa defended its position 
on human rights diplomacy against UN Watch statement This strongly 
suggests that public criticism towards South Africa have pressured the 
government to withdraw their explicit opposition against UNHR resolutions.  
With new president Jacob Zuma running office in 2009, South 
Africa’s stance on UNHR resolutions turned neutral during the period 
2009-2014. This shift in South Africa’s behavior is less likely a result of 
the president’s personality as President Zuma declared that his foreign policy 
priorities are in continuities with those of the previous government. Rather, 
the change seems to result from an increase in pressures on South Africa to 
abide by human rights norm it committed upon. Right after Zuma became a 
president in 2009, renowned INGO Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the 
President Zuma and urged him to make human rights issues a central pillar 
of South Africa’s foreign policy.70) 
Recognizing the heightened expectation, the Zuma government seemed 
to be determined to put human rights to the center of its foreign policy. 
Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, Deputy Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperations, affirmed in 2009 that South Africa “intend to more robustly 
flex our muscles on human rights issues so that we can never be accused 
of betraying the ideals on which our democracy was founded.”71) Moreover, 
69) United Nations, “Summary Record of the 49th Meeting,” December 14, 2007, U.N. 
Doc. A/C.3/62/SR.49, pp. 10. 
70) Human Rights Watch, “Letter to President-Elect Zuma on South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy” (May 9, 2009) https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/08/letter-president-elect-zuma-
south-africas-foreign-policy (Accessed June 19, 2016).  
71) “Reply to the budget vote by Deputy Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation, Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, to the National Assembly,” South African 
Government Information (June 18, 2009), http://www.anc.org.za/caucus/show.php?ID=11
15  (Accessed June 22, 2016).  
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its voting similarity score with China on UNHR resolutions in 2009 was 
even below 0.5 in 2009, indicating that South Africa expressed general 
support for the resolutions. 
Critics often point out that in reality South Africa’s foreign policy in 
terms of human rights issues has not changed much during Zuma 
adminstration. Notwithstanding the initial expectation, President Zuman put 
little effort to put human rights issues to the forefront of South Africa’s 
foreign policy. South African government refused to issue Dalai Lama a visa 
when he was invited to attend a meeting of Nobel peace laureates in South 
Africa. It also permitted the visit of Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, 
despite the fact that he was indicted by the ICC for driving genocide in 
Darfur. Nonetheless, there are signs that South Africa’s policies are 
constrained by normative criticisms. For instance, South Africa supported the 
decision of AU Assembly in 2009 which declared that AU would not help 
the ICC arresting Bashir. Nonetheless, South Africa was aware that its 
action would tarnish its international reputation as an ICC member. As a 
consequence, the South African Department of African Affairs issued a 
statement declaring that they would respect its constitutional values and 
obligations under the Rome Statue and would arrest Bashir if he visits 
South Africa.72) In addition, in terms of UNHR voting, South Africa decided 
to remain neutral on the issue. During Zuma administration South Africa 
abstained on UNHR voting despite the fact that it still sides with 
authoritarian states such as Cuba and voices concern for politicization of 
UNHR resolutions.73)
72) “South Africa legally rebuts AU resolutions on arresting Bashir,” the Sudan Tribune 
(August 3, 2009) http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31996 (Accessed June 
22, 2016). 
73) United Nations, “Summary record of the 46th meeting,” (January 14, 2015) U.N. Doc. 
A/C.3/69/SR.46, pp. 10. 
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In sum, the case of South Africa demonstrates how norm diffusion 
significantly influenced UN voting pattern of countries who have forged 
close political and economic ties with China. South Africa was more 
constrained by normative criticisms as they revealed the inconsistency 
between South Africa’s voting pattern and its previous commitment to 
emerging human rights norm such as participating in the ICC and HRC. 
40
3. Theoretical Hypotheses 
This section lays out theoretical hypotheses to support the argument in this 
paper. To examine the impact of normative pressures on UN voting since 
the early 2000s, we examine how countries with varying degrees of 
commitment to the emerging human rights norm responded to growing 
normative pressures on UNHR voting. In recent years, countries have 
explicitly signalled their commitment to the new human rights norm by 
participating in two international organizations: ICC and HRC. Given the 
unique nature of the ICC with enforcement mechanism, becoming a member 
of the ICC demonstrates countries' commitment to bear sovereignty cost and 
support interventionist approaches to resolve domestic human rights problems 
of states.74) Participating in the HRC also indicates that member states 
would be responsible for actively addressing domestic human rights abuses 
of states and discuss country-specific mandates within its sessions.  
Two mechanisms of norm diffusions could explain the effect of ICC 
and HRC membership on UNHR voting. First, there is perceived cost of 
following the previously made commitment to human rights norm. ICC and 
HRC members’ commitment is not a mere cheap talk as they are more 
pressured from domestic and external audience to consistently act in 
accordance with the norm they agreed upon. For instance, ahead of the 
ordinary session of the AU, INGOs in Africa jointly sent a letter to Foreign 
Ministers participating in the session to strengthen cooperation with the ICC 
and uphold their mandates and obligations made to the ICC.75) Voting 
records of HRC members are consistently checked by INGOs and criticized 
74) Hawkins, 2004, pp. 779-804; Deitelhoff, 2009, pp. 33-65. 
75) Human Rights, “Letter to Foreign Ministers of African States Parties to the ICC” 
(January 26, 2012) https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/26/letter-foreign-ministers-african-
states-par (Accessed June 19, 2016).  
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if they are against country-specific mandates. The aforementioned case of 
South Africa also demonstrates that ICC and HRC member states could be 
named and shamed when their act is not seen to be complying with the 
committed norm. 
ICC and HRC members hence face considerable cost of losing its 
legitimacy within the international community when failing to act in 
accordance with emerging human rights norm. Their situation is analogous 
to doctors in a medical association who “are more likely to follow the 
norms of the association because membership in it exerts pressures to at 
least appear that they are complying with the standards of conduct in the 
profession.”76) There are signs that member states do care about consistent 
act in accordance with their committed norm. For instance, when the US 
pressured countries to sign Nonsurrender Agreements that prevent them from 
surrendering Americans to the ICC, many states refused to do because they 
were concerned about domestic audience cost of violating their commitment 
to the ICC.77)
Considering that the content of UNHR resolutions also represents the 
very same norm of interventionist approaches towards human rights, it is 
likely that when normative pressures to vote in favour of UNHR resolutions 
increased the early 2000s, ICC and HRC member would more readily 
support UNHR resolutions to avoid legitimacy cost. 
Second, besides the aforementioned mechanism of norm diffusion, 
another mechanism may have played a role in the association between 
UNHR voting and ICC and HRC membership: affinity towards emerging 
76) Christine Min Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Global Human Rights and States 
Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001,” 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 23, Issue. 4 (2008), pp. 736. 
77) Judith Kelley, “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International 
Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 101, Issue. 3 (2007), pp. 573-589.  
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human rights norm. It is also possible that some ICC and HRC would 
support UNHR resolutions because they believe in moral righteousness of 
emerging human rights norm. In case of ratifying the ICC, empirical 
research and anecdotes suggest that ratifying the ICC could be interpreted as 
countries' willingness to support interventionist approaches to resolve 
domestic human rights problems of states.78) Therefore, as an extension of 
showing their support for emerging human rights norm rather than a concern 
for the cost of their commitment, ICC and HRC members would vote in 
favour of UNHR resolutions. 
This paper does not sought to separately test these two mechanisms 
of norm diffusion since either of these mechanisms could explain the impact 
of norm diffusion on African countries’ UNHR voting. Moreover, either of 
the two mechanisms could be explained by ICC and HRC membership. 
Hence there is no need to disentangle the aforementioned two mechanisms 
of norm diffusion.
Hypothesis 1 Since the early 2000s, countries with ICC and HRC 
membership are more likely to not vote in accordance with China on 
UNHR resolutions than countries without membership.  
The effect of norm diffusion on African countries’ UN human rights 
voting could be primarily examined from the average voting pattern of early 
ratifiers and non-ratifiers of the ICC treaty.79) Figure Ⅲ-4 shows that before 
78) Kelley, 2007, pp. 573-589; Simmons and Danner, 2010, pp. 225-256.
79) African countries who have ratified the Rome Statute between the year 1999 and 
2000 are classified as early ratifiers. These countries are Senegal, Ghana, Mali, 
Lesotho, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Gabon and South Africa. On the other hand, a 
group of non-ratifiers consists of Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Sudan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe.
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the early 2000s, when normative pressures on UNHR resolutions voting 
were absent or minimal, the gap between voting similarity scores of early 
ratifiers and non ratifiers was smaller and at times converging On the other 
hand, when there were increasing normative pressures to support UNHR 
resolutions after the early 2000s, ICC members start to more readily voted 
in favour of UNHR resolutions. Compared to non-ICC members, the speed 
of their voting in favour of UNHR resolutions is much faster and the gap 
of voting similarity with China between members and non-ICC members 
gets wider. This suggests that there have been normative pressures on 
UNHR voting beginning in the early 2000s. 
<Figure Ⅲ-4> ICC and Non-ICC Members' Voting Similarity with China 
on UNHR Resolutions, 1992-2014: Source. Based on United Nations General 
Assembly Voting Data from Voeten, 2013, pp. 54-66.
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In this paper, participation in UN peacekeeping is not considered as 
countries’ commitment to the new human rights norm. Although the ICC 
and UN peacekeeping are known to share the broad notion of collective 
actions towards domestic problems of individual states,80) states primarily 
concern security and military issues when participating in UN peacekeeping 
missions. In this sense, participants in UN peacekeeping missions are less 
likely to be seen as committed to emerging human rights norm and would 
face less legitimacy cost when voting against UNHR resolutions.
To further check the role of normative pressures in diminishing the 
political influence of China's economic ties, it is possible to conjecture that 
prior to the early 2000s during which normative pressures on UNHR voting 
was nearly absent, the effect of international human rights regime 
membership would not have been significant. On the other hand, material 
incentives from China would significant influenced African countrie’s voting 
decision on UNHR voting. Since HRC did not exist prior to the early 
2000s, the effect of ICC membership is solely tested. 
 
Hypothesis 2 Prior to the early 2000s, the effect of ICC membership 
would not have been significant. On the other hand, the influence of 
Chinese material incentives on human rights voting would have been 
significant.
Alternative hypotheses are also proposed in order to account for 
another factors that led the change in African countries’ voting behavior on 
UNHR resolutions. First, the effect of US aid on African countries’ UN 
80) Eric Neumayer, “A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and 
Ratification of the International Criminal Court,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46, 
Issue. 5 (2009), pp. 659-670; Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, “Credible 
Commitments and the International Criminal Court,” International Organization, Vol. 
64 (2010), pp. 225-256. 
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vote decision are taken into account. The US also emphasizes the 
importance of voting records of UNHR resolutions. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the US State Department has annually addressed UNHR 
resolutions to be vital to America's national interests. Starting from the early 
1980s, the US State Department annually released the document "Voting 
Practices in the United Nations" and listed UN resolutions that are 
considered to be important to the US. The Department of State makes it 
clear that "a country's behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to 
its bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of 
State regularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors."81) 
During the period 1992-2014, the State department listed most of UNHR 
resolutions to be "important" issues and voted in favor of all but one of 
these resolutions (See Appendix 1). 
It is therefore reasonable to argue that the US uses its aid to induce 
countries to follow America's position on UNGA resolutions that are 
considered to be "important" to the US. There are a few empirical studies 
that corroborate this argument. Wang examines the period between 1980s 
and 1990s and argues that the US aid induces countries to follow America's 
position on issues in the UN that are regarded as "important" to the US.82) 
Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele examine sub-categories of the US aid and 
suggest that general budget support and untied grant strongly generate 
foreign policy compliance of secondary states.83) Flore-Macías and Kreps 
also find that the US aid induces developing states to not vote in line with 
81) Quoted in Thomas B. Anderson, Thomas Harr and Finn Tarp, “On US Politics and 
IMF Lending,” European Economic Review, Vol. 50, Issue. 7 (2006), pp. 1843-1862. 
82) T.Y. Wang, “US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43 (1999), pp. 199-210.
83) Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, “Does US Aid Buy UN General 
Assembly Vote? A Disaggregated Analysis,” Public Choice, Vol. 136 (2008), pp. 
139-164. 
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China on UNHR resolutions.84) In this regard, the following hypothesis can 
be derived:
 
Hypothesis 3 Countries receiving more aid from the US are more 
likely to not vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions. 
<Figure Ⅲ-5> Aid Money to Africa from the US and China, 1992-2014: 
Note. US and Chinese aid measured as a share of recipient countries’ GDP. Source.
US aid data from USAID data. Chinese aid data from Strange et al., forthcoming, 
pp. 1-29. 
84) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371. 
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Preliminary examination shown in Figure Ⅲ-5 does not support the 
alternative hypothesis. Figure shows that from the early 2000s, average flow 
of the US aid fluctuates and does not increase dramatically to induce 
African countries to vote against Chinese stance on UNHR resolutions. On 
the other hand, the amount of Chinese aid increases during the period.  
While Figure Ⅲ-5 shows that US aid does not increase dramatically to 
change UN voting pattern in Africa, the figure is based on aggregate data 
and hence it would be too early to conclude that aid money from the US　
had no impact on UN voting decision of African countries. 
Second, African countries’ domestic conditions could affect their 
voting decision on UNHR resolutions. Democracies and countries with good 
human rights records are more likely to support interventionist principles 
towards human rights issues to punish autocracies and human rights 
offenders.85) In addition, the incidence of civil wars could also matter in 
voting decision on UNHR resolutions. Countries undergoing civil wars could 
oppose UNHR resolutions because of the fear that their domestic affairs 
could be interfered. On the other hand, these states might support UNHR 
resolutions in order to resolve their domestic problems. Considering the 
potential impact of these domestic conditions on UNHR voting, following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 4a Democracies are less likely to not vote in line with 
China on UNHR resolutions. 
Hypothesis 4b Human Rights Offenders are more likely to vote in 
line with China on UNHR resolutions. 
Hypothesis 4c Countries experiencing civil wars are more likely to 
vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions. 
85) Kelley, 2007, pp. 577.
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Lastly, the influence of threat perceptions towards China on UNHR 
resolutions is taken into account. As discussed in the previous section of 
literature review, the case of East and Southeast Asia illustrates that increase 
in China’s military capabilities or historical animosity could lead secondary 
states in the region to balance against China instead of accommodate 
Chinese foreign policies.86) 
However, the argument that China’s military rise is responsible for the 
change in African countries’ UN voting pattern is implausible given that 
China does not have any military power or interest in African region. 
Sino-African relations have no historical legacies and are not fraught with 
suspicion and hostilities that characterize Sino-Asian relations. Nor is their 
relationship aggravated by maritime territorial disputes as in Southeast Asian 
region. Only recently did China began to increase its military involvement 
in African region in order to help to resolve growing insecurities in the 
region and this by no means implies that China is becoming a threatening 
figure to African countries.87) In this sense, by examining African region 
“we can better isolate foreign policy consequences of trade than other 
studies.”88) In this sense, this alternative hypothesis does not hold in case of 
Sino-African relations and hence would not be examined in statistical 
analyses.
86) Ross, 2006, pp. 119-156; Lim and Cooper, 2015, pp. 696-727. 
87) Ayush Midha, “Shifting Tides in Sino-African Relations,” Harvard Political Review, 
Feb 8, 2016, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/shifting-tides-sino-african-relations-case-sou
th-sudan/  (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
88) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 360.
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IV. Empirical Analyses
1. Model, Data, and Method
To examine the relationship between African countries’ economic 
interdependence on China and their foreign policy convergence with China, 
this paper uses time-series and cross sectional data (TSCS). The unit of 
analyses is dyad-year of 46 African countries for the period 1992-2012. 
Research design is more fully discussed below. 
To assess both African countries' stance on human rights issues and 
their alignment with Chinese foreign policy, this paper uses the yearly 
average voting on UN country-specific human rights resolution between the 
period 1992-2002. The previous section outlined that China has consistently 
defended non-interventionist approaches to human rights issues. The voting 
record of China reveals that China consistently opposed UNHR resolutions 
(Appendix 1). In this sense, voting divergence from China can be interpreted 
as a willingness to respect an active and interventionist principles towards 
human rights agenda. This paper follows the same coding rule of 
Flores-Macías and Kreps, and Thacker.89) The variable takes the value of 1 
when states agrees with China, 0 if disagrees with China and 0.5 if one 
state abstained but the other voted in favour or against human rights 
resolutions. This variable is log transformed in order to facilitate 
interpretation in percentage terms. 
African countries’ ICC and HRC membership is measured as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 on the year countries ratified the 
ICC treaty or are a member of the ICC in that given year, otherwise 0. 
89) Flores-Macias and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371; Strom Thacker, “The High Politics of 
IMF Lending,” World Politics, Vol. 52, Issue. 1 (1999), pp. 38-75. 
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For other explanatory variables, this paper utilizes the same variables 
used in the analysis of Flores-Macías and Kreps: Chinese trade salience, US 
trade salience, US aid and national capabilities.90) Chinese and US trade 
salience are measured as total amount of bilateral trade with China or US 
divided by recipients’ GDP in that given year. Bilateral trade data come 
from the Correlates of War (COW) International Trade data, v.3.0, 
1870-200991) and GDP data from World Bank World Development 
Indicators.92) Because COW International Trade data are only available for 
the period until 2009, the amount of bilateral trade during 2010-2012 is 
estimated according to the methodology specified by Barbieri, Keshk, and 
Pollins.93) US aid is measured by the amount of US economic aid 
commitment divided by recipients’ GDP. US aid data come from USAID 
Foreign Aid Explorer dataset which specifies aid money given to recipient 
government by the US government.94) 
We also measure variables for regime type and human rights records 
of African countries. The variable regime type is a revised polity Ⅵ score 
ranging from –10 to 10. The value of –10 indicates autocracies and 10 
democracies.95) Human rights variable is based on Political Terror Scale 
(PTS), which is the average rating of Amnesty International and US State 
90) Flores-Macias and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371. 
91) Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set 
Codebook, v.3.0. (2012), http://correlatesofwar.org (Accessed April 19, 2016).  
92) World Bank website, http://data.worldbank.org/ (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
93) Katherine Barbieri, Omar Keshk and Brian Pollins, “Trading Data: Evaluating our 
Assumptions and Coding Rule,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 26, 
Issue. 5 (2009), pp. 471-491. I first collect trade data based on importers’ report 
based on IMF Direction of Trade (DOT) data since countries are more likely to 
monitor thoroughly on goods that come into their country rather than leaving it. 
When trade data is missing, we imputed data from exporters’ report. 
94) USAID website, https://explorer.usaid.gov/ (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
95) Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity Ⅵ Dataset, v.4.0. (2008), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/ (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
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Department’s reports on human rights.96) The PTS score of 1 indicates that 
citizens receive no repression from their government while the score 5 
means that there is severe repression from the state. Civil war variable is 
based on UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4 and takes the value of 1 
when the country is undergoing a civil war that resulted in 1000 battle 
deaths in that given year and otherwise 0.97) Lastly, national capability 
variable is log transformation of Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC), which takes into account demographic, industrial and military 
capabilities that “reflect the breadth and depth of the resources that a nation 
could bring to bear in instances of conflict.”98) The CINC score measures a 
ratio of one’s material power out of world’s total material power and is 
based on the COW National Material Capabilities Dataset v.4.0. CINC score 
is available only for the period until 2007 and hence for the rest of the 
period we impute the value in 2007 considering that countries’ ranking of 
CINC score rarely changes over time. 
Since Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013) did not measure the effect of 
Chinese aid on UN voting, this paper additionally includes predictors which 
measure the amount of Chinese aid money. In case of Chinese aid, it is 
difficult to estimate the amount since China does not report their 
development assistance activities to the international reporting regime. This 
limitation could be overcome by using a novel dataset obtained with 
open-source methodology for the period 2000-2012.99) This new media-based 
methodology follows several steps to ensure reliable data collection. In the 
96) Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale, 1976-2015 
(2015), http://www.politicalterrorscale.org (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
97) Thérese Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2015,” Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 52, Issue. 4 (2015), pp. 536-550.
98) Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities Data Documentation (2005). v.3.0., 
pp. 3. 
99) Strange et al., forthcoming, pp. 1-29.
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first stage researchers collect individual-level project information from 
various sources. This stage involves four steps. First, researchers find 
Chinese project information from a search engine Factiva which draws 
31,000 sources from 200 countries. Second, based on the obtained project 
information researchers navigate aid and debt information management 
system of recipient/borrower government. Third, they extract information 
from development finance institution websites such as Chinese embassy and 
Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office (ECCO). Lastly, researchers 
identify aid project information from academic articles found in Google 
Scholar. In the following second stage researchers assess and enhance their 
obtained data. In this stage researchers constantly repeat the previous steps 
and refine and recode their project description.100) 
This media-based data is not without its own limitations. Researchers 
using this data point out that media-based information cannot perfectly 
substitute for “complete and accurate statistical data from official 
sources.”101) Nonetheless, it is by far the most systematic, transparent and 
multi-level source data that tracks the flow of Chinese aid to individual 
African countries given that there is no disaggregate data on Chinese aid to 
this date. Moreover, the advantage of this media-based data is that 
researchers follow the entire life cycle of individual aid projects and code 
them according to their status of pledge/commitment or suspended/completed 
which enables us to categorize Chinese aid in detail and better understand 
100) Researchers aim to track under-reported Chinese aid data by documenting aid 
projects from various sources such as search engines, official records of 
recipient/donor governments and academic articles. For more detailed information on 
methodology of data collection, visit AidData website, http://china.aiddata.org/ 
(Accessed April 19, 2016).
101) Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher 
and Vijaya Ramachandran, “China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Meida-Based 
Approach to Data Collection,” Center for Global Development Working Papers (April, 
2003), pp. 3. 
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its effect.102) 
Among different categories of Chinese aid, this paper primarily uses 
the broadest one labelled as "Official Assistance" that combines the amount 
of Official Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF) and 
Vague Types.103) This is because a considerable amount of Chinese aid is 
classified as Vague Types that cannot be categorized into either ODA or 
OOF. Moreover, researchers using this data finds that this broad category of 
Chinese official aid exerts a significant political influence on African 
states.104) Since the substantial number of Chinese aid projects lacks 
respective financial values, as Chinese aid variable this paper uses the 
number of Chinese aid projects divided by recipient countries’ GDP in that 
given year. 
The estimation method for models in this paper is OLS regression. 
All models include country fixed effects to control for country-specific 
unobserved factors. I do not control time trend in our model since results of 
panel-specific, augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejected the null hypothesis that 
our panel data is non-stationary. All trade and aid related variables are log 
transformed to better estimate our linear models and make our results robust 
102) Besides studies on the political consequences of Chinse trade, recent research on 
Chinese political economy began to employ media-based collection to support their 
arguments and find interesting results. See also, Steven Liao and Daniel Mcdowell, 
“No Reservation: International Order and Demand for the Renminbi as a Reserve 
Currency,” International Studies Quarterly (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv020 
(Accessed April 19 2016).  
103) ODA refers to official aid that is (a) provided by official agencies, (b) has its 
objectives on economic development and welfare of developing countries and (c) is 
concessional and includes grant element of at least 25 percent. On the other hand, 
OOF refers to official aid that does not meet the aforementioned standard of ODA 
either because (a) it does not have development purpose or (b) has grant element less 
than 25 percent. 
104) Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-32; Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, 
Parks, Raschky and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-52. 
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to outliers. 
This paper estimates statistical models on the period 2002-2012 
considering that the normative pressures on UNHR voting began to increase 
in the early 2000s. Especially, the trend of African countries’ voting 
similarity with China on UNHR resolutions shows the year 2002 as an 
important turning point in the diffusion of ICC treaties. However, our 
findings remain unchanged when we used different turning points such as 
2000 or 2001. Moreover, the effect of ICC and HRC membership on 
UNHR voting increases as I estimate the latter period of time. This implies 
that normative pressures on UNHR voting did not increase suddenly at 
certain period of time but rather increased slowly in the early 2000s. Data 
after the year 2012 is excluded from statistical analysis as Chinese aid 
projects variable is only available for the period 2000-2012. However, when 
estimating the effect of ICC and HRC membership during the period 
2002-2014 after excluding Chinse aid projects variable the effect remains 
significant.  
2. Results 
Table 1 and 2 shows the result of our analyses. Clustered robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. A star indicates the existence of statistical 
significance at the 95 percent level.
The first and second hypothesis is evaluated in Table Ⅵ-1. First, the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient of ICC and HRC Membership 
for the 2002-2012 period indicates that ICC members were more likely to 
support UNHR resolutions when controlling for other factors that affect vote 
decisions in UNHR resolutions. The effect of ICC membership (coef = 
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-0.154) is more significant than that of the HRC membership (coef = 
-0.055). This would be so because the HRC membership is lasts only for 
three years and normative pressures on members could be limited. On the 
other hand, the ICC offers a permanent platform for member states to 
convent conferences and exchange their thoughts. 
On the other hand, during the period 1992-2002 the effect of ICC 
membership does not pressure African countries to support UNHR 
resolutions. Rather, the effect of ICC membership seems to be associated 
with opposing UNHR resolutions. This should be interpreted that ICC 
membership was not a mediating mechanism of norm diffusion during the 
period 1992-2001 when normative pressures on UNHR voting was scant. 
Hypothesis 3 regarding the effect of the US aid does not hold in the 
result of statistical analyses. During the period 2002-2012, the effect of US 
aid is insignificant. The results imply that the shift in the amount of 
bilateral aid could not have been a decisive factor for the shift in African 
countries’ voting pattern on country-specific human rights resolutions in the 
UNGA. In addition, US trade salience does not seem to induce states to 
support UNHR resolutions. According to the model in table Ⅵ-1, the 
increase in US trade salience is even associated with the increase in voting 
similarity with China. This result could mean that once the normative 
pressures on UNHR voting increased, economic incentives from the US 
became less important to African countries’ voting on UNHR resolutions.  
Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c is also evaluated. African countries’ human 
rights records are not significantly associated with UNHR voting. On the 
other hand, democracies were more likely to note vote in line with China 
on UNHR resolutions. Occurrence of civil wars is not associated with 
supporting UNHR resolutions. Overall results indicate that particular domestic 
conditions of African states such as democracy could also influence their 
voting decision. Nonetheless, the models demonstrates that even after 
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controlling for domestic conditions the impact of international norm 
pressures was profound on African countries.  
The results also demonstrates different effects of Chinese trade and 
aid on UN human rights voting. During the period 2002-2012, Chinese trade 
salience induces African countries to not vote in alignment with China on 
UNHR resolutions. This contrasts the finding of Flores-Macías and Kreps 
according to which Chinese trade salience exerts a significant influence on 
African countries' voting similarity with China.105) Because bilateral trade 
has only a persuasive influence but not coercive power based on rewards 
and punishment, the effect of Chinese trade seems to become negative when 
norm diffusion came to play an important role in African countries’ UN 
voting decision. On the other hand, the effect of Chinese aid remains 
significant for non-ICC members during the period 2002-2012, which 
demonstrates that Chinese aid can be yield stronger political influence than 
Chinese trade. 
105) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371. 
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Dependent Variable : Voting Similarity 



















































Adjusted R2 0.152 0.325
F Statistic 9.490* 24.688*
<Table Ⅵ-1> The Effect of the ICC Membership on UN Voting Similarity 
with China, 1992-2012: Ln() indicates that variables are log transformed. 
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V. Conclusion 
 This study brought diffusion of international human rights norm into the 
discussion of foreign policy consequences of increasing China’s charm 
offensive. This paper suggests that in order to account for the diminishing 
effect of China’s soft power diplomacy on UN human rights voting, we 
should go beyond traditional theories based on economic incentives and 
military capabilities. By examining UNHR voting pattern of countries with 
ICC and HRC membership, we observe the process of norm diffusion and 
the impact of normative pressures on UNHR voting. During the period 
2002-2012, ICC and HRC members would more readily vote in favor of 
UNHR resolutions than non-ICC members. On the other hand, during 
1992-2002 the effect of ICC membership was not effective whereas Chinese 
trade was.  
The argument of this paper is not without limitations. First and 
foremost, because my dissertation only examines African cases it is 
questionable whether the effect of norm diffusion could also account for UN 
human rights voting of developing countries in other region. Bearing in 
mind the specific regional implication of my argument, we also need to 
consider whether ICC and HRC membership represents countries’ 
commitment to abide by emerging new international norm in other regional 
context.    
Second, besides two mechanisms of norm diffusion –commitment 
problems and affinity towards norm- outlined in this paper, there might be 
other paths in which norm diffusion can induce African countries to not 
vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions. Perhaps these alternative 
mechanisms could be sought from examining cases of other African 
countries that are not covered in this dissertation. 
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Nonetheless, this paper attempts to complement the previous literature 
on foreign policy consequences of China’s charm offensive strategies in two 
ways. First, in discussing secondary states' response to increasing Chinese 
trade and aid, my argument suggests that we need to consider other factors 
that now plays a decisive role in international relations after the Cold War: 
increasing importance of normative factors and role of multilateral 
institutions. When these elements are counted for, the political leverage of 
emerging powers' economic ties could be less significant. My argument 
hence differ from the existing research has primarily highlighted material 
factors such as trade and military capabilities. African countries’ voting 
behavior in terms of UNHR resolutions shows that normative concern often 
overrides material payoffs in international politics. Moreover, this paper 
focused on the impact of China’s charm offensive strategies on African 
countries that has received relatively scant attention compared to Sino-Asian 
relations. 
For future research agenda, this paper suggests to look for the effect 
of China’s charm offensive strategy in other areas of foreign policy issues 
such as maritime territorial disputes or one China policy. Examining out 
whether there is a turning point and why the change occurred would lead 
us to find meaningful implications of increasing China’s soft power 
diplomacy. In addition, further inquiring how China deals with diminishing 
effect of its charm offensive would enhance out understanding of dynamic 
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<Appendix 2> Descriptive Statistics 
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Note. Figures in parentheses denote the number of years in observation. 
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국  
본 논  증가하는  역과 원조  변 는 국  매 공
 (Charm Offensive) 략이 국이 가장 요하게 생각하는 외  사안
인 인권 외 에 어떤 향  미쳤는지를 국-아프리카 계에  탐구한
다. 증가하는  역과 원조에도 불구하고 아프리카 국가들  2000
  이후부  엔에  진행 는 특  국가에 한 인권결 안
에  국  램과는 달리 차 찬   늘리  시작했다. 이
러한 추 는 아프리카에  국이 공  개한 매 공  략에 
추어 볼  요한 퍼즐이라고 볼  있다. 본 논  핵심질  
 역과 국 원조  증가에도 불구하고  국  향 이 아프리카 
국가들에 한 인권외 에  감소하고 있는가이다. 
본 논  2000  이후 아프리카 지역에  국  매 공  
략  효과가 차 약해지는 원인  국  인권 규범  산  결과  본
다. 국내 인권 에 한 극  개입  강조하는 인권규범이  계
 르게 산 는 과 에  엔인권 결 안  지지하라는 국  
차원  규범  압  역시 증가하 다.
본 논   주장  뒷 침하  해 사  연구  통계 모  
용한다. 우 , 규범 산이 아프리카 국가들  엔 결 안 에 미
 향  살펴보  해 남아프리카 공 국  사 를 본다. 남아프리카 
공 국  국과 한 , 외  계를 맺  해 노 해 며 
그 결과 엔인권 결 안 에  국과 같  입장  취해 다. 그러
나 2000   이후 남아프리카 공 국   행 는 내외 인 
에 직면하게 었다. 한 남아프리카 공 국   행 는 남아프리
카 공 국이 여러 국  인권 도에 참여한 과거 행  모 다는 사
실   큰  게 다. 그 결과 남아프리카 공 국  2000  
 이후 엔인권 결 안 에  립  지하게 다. 
본 논  국 사재 소(International Criminal Court)  엔인권
82
이사회 (Human Rights Council) 회원국 여부를  국가들  새 운 
인권 규범에 한 구속 여부를 한다.   구들  가입 여부를 
탕   가지 경  규범 산 과  시할  있다. 첫째, 국
사재 소  엔인권이사회에 가입한 국가들  새 운 인권 규범에 동
한다는 신 를 이 에 보냈  에 엔 인권 결 안에 할 경우 
국  사회 내에  당  훼손   있는 험 부담이 높다. 한 
이들  굳이 험 부담  고 하지 않 라도 규범  도   지지
하는 차원  연장 상  엔인권 결 안에 찬 를 질  있다. 
이러한 가  탕  본 논  다 과 같   가지 가  
시한다. 첫째, 다른 조건  통 하면, 2002-2012  시 에 엔 인권결
안 지지에 한 규범  압 이 증가하   국 사재 소  엔
인권이사회 회원국들  회원국들보다 엔인권 결 안  엔인권 결
안  지지할 가능 이  높다. 째, 1992-2002  시 에 엔인권 
에 한 인권 국 도 가입  향  미하지 않  면에  
역  향  미하다. 본 연구  주장  뒷 침하  해  
1992-2012  시  46개 아프리카 국가들  엔인권 결 안 결과를 
분 한 결과,  가 에 한 경험  증거를 인할  있었다.   
본 연구  결과는 다 과 같   가지 함 를 시한다. 첫째, 
존 연구들이 경  인  군사  역량이라는 질  요인에만 한
하여 국  매 공  략  효과를 분 한 면, 본 논   역
과 원조   향 이 규범 · 도  요인과 상 작용하고 있  
보여주었다. 엔인권 결 안에 한 아프리카 국가들   행 는 국
에  규범  고 가 종종 질  인  뛰어   있  보여
다. 째, 본 논  결과는 국-아프리카 계  역동 인 상  작용
과 변 를 보여 써, 국-아시아 계보다 연구보다 심이 했  
국-아프리카 계를 연구하고, 향후 국과 아프리카 국가들 간  
계가 어떻게 개   있 지에 한 함 를 시한다.  
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